Ask the Heat Treat Doctor®: How Do Parts Fail?

The Heat Treat Doctor® has returned to offer sage advice to Heat Treat Today readers and to answer your questions about heat treating, brazing, sintering, and other types of thermal treatments as well as questions on metallurgy, equipment, and process-related issues.

Product failures (Figure 1) can often be traced to deficiencies in design, materials, manufacturing, quality, maintenance, service-related factors, and human error to name a few. Examples of failures include misalignment, buckling, excessive distortion, cracking, fracture, creep, fatigue, shock, wear, corrosion, and literally hundreds of other mechanisms. Let’s learn more.

Figure 1. Image of damage to left fuselage and engine; fire damage to nacelle.
Source: National Transportation Safety Board

Figure 2.: Model of material science depicting— key interactions and /interrelationships
Source: The HERRING GROUP, Inc.

Whatever the source, it is important to recognize that it is next to impossible to separate the product from the process. Performance, design (properties and material), metallurgy (microstructure), heat treatment (process and equipment), and maintenance are all interconnected (Figure 2).

When considering ways to prevent failures from occurring, one must determine the factors involved and whether they acted alone or in combination with one another. Ask questions such as, “Which of the various failure modes were the most important contributors?” and “Was the design robust enough?” and “Were the safety factors properly chosen to meet the application rigors imposed in service?” Having a solid engineering design coupled with understanding the application, loading, and design requirements is key to avoiding failures. If failures do happen, we must know what contributed to them.

Let’s review a few of the more common failure modes.

Fracture Types on a Macroscopic Scale

Applied loads may be unidirectional or multi-directional in nature and occur singularly or in combination. The result is a macroscopic stress state comprised of normal stress (perpendicular to the surface) and/or shear stress (parallel to the surface). In combination with the other load conditions, the result is one of four primary modes of fracture: dimpled rupture (aka microvoid coalescence), cleavage, decohesive rupture, and fatigue.

Virtually all engineering metals are polycrystalline. As a result, the two basic modes of deformation/fracture (under single loading) are shear and cleavage (Table 1). The shear mechanism, which occurs by sliding along specific crystallographic planes, is the basis for the macroscopic modes of elastic and plastic deformation. The cleavage mechanism occurs very suddenly via a splitting action of the planes with very little deformation involved. Both of these micro mechanisms primarily result in transgranular (through the grains) fracture.

Fracture Types — Ductile and Brittle

Numerous factors influence whether a fracture will behave in a ductile or brittle manner (Table 2). In ductile materials, plastic deformation occurs when the shear stress exceeds the shear strength before another mode of fracture can occur, with necking typically observed before final fracture. Brittle fractures occur suddenly and exhibit very little, if any, deformation before final fracture. (The following is based on information found in Wulpi, 1985.)

Ductile fractures typically have the following characteristics:

Considerable plastic or permanent deformation in the failure region
Dull and fibrous fracture appearance

Brittle fractures typically have the following characteristics:

Lack of plastic or permanent deformation in the region of the fracture
Principal stress (or tensile stress) is perpendicular to the surface of the brittle fracture
Characteristic markings on the fracture surface pointing back to where the fracture originated

When examined under a scanning electron microscope, fracture surfaces seldom exhibit entirely dimpled rupture (i.e. ductile fracture) or entirely cleavage (i.e. brittle fracture), although one or the other may be more prevalent. Other fracture modes include intergranular fractures, combination (quasi-cleavage) fractures and fatigue fractures.

Fracture Types — Wear

Wear (Table 3) is a type of surface destruction that involves the removal of material from the surface of a component part under some form of contact produced by a form of mechanical action. Wear and corrosion are closely linked, and it is important not only to evaluate the failure but to take into consideration design and environment and have a good understanding of the service history of a component.

Fracture Types — Corrosion

Corrosion is the destruction of a component by the actions of chemical or electrochemical reactions with the service environment. The major types of corrosion include galvanic action, uniform corrosion, crevice corrosion, stress-corrosion cracking, and corrosion fatigue. The mechanisms and effects created by each of these are well documented in the literature, as in Fontana and Greene’s Corrosion Engineering (1985) and Uhlig’s Corrosion and Corrosion Control (1985). It is critical to understand that the effects of corrosion are present to some degree in every failure analysis, which is one of the reasons why protecting fracture surfaces is so critical when sending parts for failure analysis.

Table 1. Differences between shear and cleavage fracture (Data referenced from page 23 of Wulpi, see References.)
Source: The HERRING GROUP, Inc.

Table 2. Typical characteristics of ductile and brittle fractures
Source: The HERRING GROUP, Inc.

Table 3. General categories of wear
Source: The HERRING GROUP, Inc.

Final Thoughts

To avoid failures or their reoccurrence, it is important to document each step in the design and manufacture process (including heat treatment). In addition, careful documentation of failures if/when they occur is of critical importance as is assembling a team of individuals from different disciplines to perform a comprehensive investigation. This includes a thorough failure analysis to assist in determining the root cause (there is only one) and to avoid it from happening in the future.

References

Airline Safety. www.AirlineSafety.com. Accessed September 2024.

Fontana, M. G., and N. D. Greene. Corrosion Engineering, 3e. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1985.

Herring, Daniel H. Atmosphere Heat Treatment, Volume Nos. 1 & 2. BNP Media, 2014/2015.

Lawn, B.R. and T. R. Wilshaw. Fracture of Brittle Solids. Cambridge University Press, 1975.

Shipley, R. J. and W. T. Becker (Eds.). ASM Handbook, Volume 11: Failure Analysis and Prevention. ASM International, 2002.

Uhlig, H. H. Corrosion and Corrosion Control. John Wiley & Sons, 1963.

Wulpi, Donald J. Understanding How Components Fail. ASM International, 1985.

About the Author

Dan Herring
“The Heat Treat Doctor”
The HERRING GROUP, Inc.

Dan Herring has been in the industry for over 50 years and has gained vast experience in fields that include materials science, engineering, metallurgy, new product research, and many other areas. He is the author of six books and over 700 technical articles.

For more information: Contact Dan at dherring@heat-treat-doctor.com.

For more information about Dan’s books: see his page at the Heat Treat Store.

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Moving Beyond Combustion Safety — Plan the Fix

June 15, 2021 / BURNERS & COMBUSTION SYSTEMS TECHNICAL CONTENT, FEATURED NEWS, MANUFACTURING HEAT TREAT, OP-ED

Last month we began the discussion about the relationship between combustion safety and uptime, highlighting how combustion safety, reliability, emissions, and efficiency are inseparable. This month, we will explore the subject in greater detail and outline a path that can both reduce the risk of an incident and protect the bottom line.

This article written by John Clarke, technical director at Helios Electric Corporation, appears in the annual Heat Treat Today 2021 Buyer's Guide June print edition. Return to our digital editions archive on Monday June 21, 2021 to access the entire print edition online!

John B. Clarke
Technical Director
Helios Electrical Corporation
Source: Helios Electrical Corporation

How many times have we heard the tale about the man with the leaky roof? He cannot fix his roof when it is raining, and the roof doesn’t need repaired when it is not. This story is also applicable to heating system maintenance, perhaps more so than other plant maintenance activities because it so seldom “rains.” Ovens and boilers tend to be very reliable. (This statement is true for equipment operating at low or moderate temperatures, less so for equipment operating above 1832°F (1000°C).) It is exactly when the machine is properly producing parts that the planning for combustion safety, availability, and performance must occur.

The first critical step we must take is to understand that combustion safety, routine maintenance, tuning, and calibration are parts of a larger work strategy. To focus solely on the annual inspection of safety components while ignoring system tuning will not only compromise tuning and efficiency, but also the safety. We have seen how managerial reactions to high profile incidents have caused some firms to dispatch teams to annually examine valves and pressure switches. This effort is highly compromised if it does not include all aspects of system maintenance as well as capturing what is learned each time to improve future inspections and equipment designs. There is data beyond pass and fail that is valuable if we wish to optimize the performance of our equipment

Let us assume it is a clear sunny day, and we are ready to invest some time in preparing to improve our combustion system starting with a deep dive examination of two pressure switches: the low fuel gas pressure switch (LFGPS) and high fuel gas pressure switch (HFGPS). These ubiquitous components are present on nearly every fuel train and are vital for safe operation. As their names imply, they monitor the fuel pressure and shut the safety valves if the fuel gas pressure is either too high or too low.

These switches must be listed for the service they provide by an agency independent of the manufacturer – UL, TUV, FM, etc. Simply looking for a stamp may not be enough; take the time to read the file or standard being applied by the agency and determine if it describes the application. Next, ask if the pressure switch carries the basic ratings expected, like the enclosure rating (Nema or IP). Is a Nema 1 switch operating in a Nema 12 area? Temperature ratings must be confirmed. All too often a component rated for 32°F (0°C) is applied in an outdoor environment in cold climates, or one with a maximum rating of 120°F (50°C) is applied next to the hot wall of a furnace. The component may operate out of specified environmental ranges for some time, but to apply a component in this manner is betting against the house – sooner are later we are going to lose. Ask the people of Texas if the bet against sustained cold temperatures in early 2021 was worth it.

"John Clarke, Technical Director, Helios Electrical The first critical step we must take is to understand that combustion safety, routine maintenance, tuning, and calibration are parts of a larger work strategy"

Next, let us look at the contact(s) rating of the switch and how it is applied to the burner management circuit. More often than not, these switches are in control circuits fused for more current than the contact rating. If the switch rating is too low, the electrical designer has an option to use an interposing relay to increase the current carrying capacity to this device. This relay is an added component, and as such, adds yet another possible point of failure. If the relay is interposed, is it dedicated to this one switch? Multiple devices being interposed by a single relay is prohibited by NFPA 86, for good reason. Is the relay designed to fail safely? That is, will a relay coil burn out or wiring fault close the critical safety valves? Is the wire gauge suitable for the current carried and protection device used?

Next, is the switch mounted in a safe location free from possible vibration or the foot of an eager furnace operator? If the switch must be changed, are clearances provided to perform this maintenance? What is the mean time to replace (MTTR) the component? Is the way the device is wired providing a path for combustible gas to enter the control enclosure and cause an explosion? Flexible conduit, without a means to seal the connection, is a very common error. Use a properly specified cord and consider using some type of connector to terminate the wiring at the switch. A simple 7/8-16 or DIN connector not only provides additional protection from combustion gas getting into the electrical conduit but is also a great benefit when changing the component in a rush and helps to isolate the component’s control circuit during testing and calibration.

Is the pressure switch suitably protected from bad “actors” in the fuel gas? Perhaps soot is present that could foul narrow passages or H2S that could result in corrosion. These are rare conditions, but coke oven gas may not be as clean as purchased natural gas. Do we need to specify stainless steel components? Would a filter make sense to protect the switch and increase the intervals between maintenance?

Finally, let’s discuss pressure ratings. Unfortunately, nomenclature varies by manufacturer. What is the maximum pressure the device can sustain and not fail, i.e., leak fuel gas into the environment? Many switches can experience a pressure surge without risk of leakage, but the high-pressure event will damage the switch internally. It is important when determining if this rating is adequate to consider possible failure modes that might expose the pressure switch to excessive pressure. As a rule of thumb, a pressure switch must be able to sustain a surge pressure delivered to the inlet of the pressure reducing regulator immediately upstream of the device. Think of it this way, if the upstream regulator experiences a failure, the full pressure delivered to this regulator will pass to the pressure switch in question.

Other obvious pressure ratings are the maximum and minimum set points. The pressure switch should be set to trip as close to the middle of the range as possible and should never be set close to either the minimum or maximum setpoint. Is the pressure switch manually or automatically reset after a trip? In general, it is best practice that the LFGPS resets automatically, and the HFGPS requires a reset by the operator. This recommendation is because LFGPS trips each time pressure is removed from the system, and it is generally understood that the system needs fuel to operate. On the other hand, a high-pressure event is exceedingly rare, and the operator should be made aware of this unusual event.

This article has discussed a lot about the simple pressure switch. It appears to be a heavy lift to perform this analysis on every pressure switch in a facility, but take comfort, once the exercise has been completed on the first system, it is much easier to replicate what has been learned to properly assess other systems. We should most definitely insist that our OEM provides this data, in detail, when new equipment is supplied. Why did we review all these specifications? Because I have been around for a while and have seen nearly every one of these errors in the application of pressure switches on operating combustion equipment.

Next month, we will expand on the pressure switch discussion to describe the tune/calibration and testing processes. I hope this deep and specific dive has been of value. If you have any questions or comments, please let me know.

About the Author:

John Clarke, with over 30 years in the heat processing area, is currently the technical director of Helios Corporation. John’s work includes system efficiency analysis, burner design as well as burner management systems. John was a former president of the Industrial Heating Equipment Association and vice president at Maxon Corporation.

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corrosion in heat treat